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RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON ASSISTED
SUICIDE
CRISTINA L. H. TRAINA"
Yale Kamisar's writings add up to an impressive argument
against the legalization of assisted suicide and euthanasia, an
achievement all the more notable because it does not depend
on a blanket moral condemnation of these practices and so
avoids becoming mired in the contemporary debate over moral
pluralism. My assigned task, nonetheless, is to explore the contribution of religious thought to the debates over both the morality of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) /euthanasia and the
moral implications of their legalization. I have chosen to end
with feminist theological and philosophical reflections on these
questions because they supplement in important ways the "official" positions of religious bodies and so illuminate the assisted
suicide debate freshly. The whole cant of this discussion may
reveal a medieval sensibility about the connections between law
and morality: that the bindingness of law depends on its justice,
and its justice is dependent on its genuinely advancing the
common good.1 But given our current understandings of the
ways in which social practices construct morality, perhaps such
medievalism is again appropriate.
My reflections come in three parts. First, what do the religions say about PAS/euthanasia? Second, in what ways are those
teachings relevant to courts and legislative bodies? And, finally,
what can feminist philosophers and theologians contribute to
the discourse?

Assistant Professor, Northwestern University Department of Religion. Thanks to
Ann Nicholson Weber, Manfred Vogel, and Benjamin D. Sommer for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay, and to the editors of TheJournalof CriminalLaw
& Criminology for their gracious assistance with the notes.
See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 993-95, 1019-20 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province, trans., Christian Classics 1981) (first part of the second
part, question 90 and question 96, article four).
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I. RELIGIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS

Because policymakers often ask about the official or representative positions of the major religious communions, I begin
with these.2 Across the major traditions there is a history of opposition to PAS/euthanasia, for related but slightly different
reasons. In each case the practices must be seen in the context
of the tradition's beliefs about death and the ways in which we
ought to prepare for a good death. And in most cases, the incredible existential weight accorded the "natural" process of dying is traceable to a belief that our final days or hours have
profound significance for reincarnation, afterlife, or resurrection.
Buddhists and Hindus believe in reincarnation-a person's
earthly life and earthly suffering do not end with the death of
her current body. But the death of a human being does end the
period in which she can most fruitfully improve her karma and
reduce future earthly suffering. Thus artificially shortening life
in order to relieve physical suffering in the short term may actually increase existential suffering in the long term. Even painkillers that dull the consciousness or induce coma, while not
forbidden, can compromise preparations for death. s
Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy likewise oppose
PAS/euthanasia, for strenuous efforts either to hasten death or
2

Not all representative positions are official. Many communions do not function

as policymaking institutions, and in many that do, there has been such a presumption
against assisted suicide that few have thought it necessary to speak out against it.
Gerald Larue's 1985 Hemlock Society survey uncovered the near-consensus below.
GERALD A. LARUE, EUTHANASIA AND RELIGION: A SURVEY OF THE ATrITUDES OF WORLD
RELIGIONS TO THE RIGHT-TO-DIE (1985).

Subsequent discussions rely to some degree

on Larue's book, suggesting both the force of religious opposition in the 1980s and
the need for more thorough and contemporary research. See Ron Hamel & Edwin R.
DuBose, PartFour: Views of the Major Faith Traditions, in AcrIvE EUTHANASIA, RELIGION,
AND THE PUBIC DEBATE, 45-77 (Ron Hamel ed., 1991); Rev. Richard E. Coleson, Contemporary Religious Viewpoints on Suicide, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active
Euthanasia, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 43 (1996). Analyses not relying on Larue include THE
CHURCHES SPEAK ON EUTHANASIA (J. Gordon Melton ed., 1991) [hereinafter THE
CHURCHES SPEAK], and (less directly useful) PERSPECTIVES ON DEATH AND DYING: CROSSCULTURAL AND MULT-DISCiPLNARY VIEWS (Arthur Berger et al., eds., 1989). All five
texts have been used in constructing the mosaic below.
" On Buddhism, see LARUE, supra note 2, at 135-37; Hamel & DuBose, supranote 2,
at 75-77; Philip A. Lesco, Euthanasia:A Buddhist Perspective, in THE CHURCHES SPEAK,
supra note 2, at 199-204. On Hinduism, see LARUE, supra note 2, at 138-39; Hamel &
DuBose, supra note 2, at 74-75. For a thorough discussion of Hindu medical ethics,
see generally PRAKASH N. DESAi, HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN THE HINDU TRADITION
(1989).
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to prolong life interfere with God's plans for the soul. Many
approve what has been called passive euthanasia, ceasing all but
palliative treatment for a dying patient. But both suicide and
killing the innocent are forbidden. For Roman Catholics and
the Eastern Orthodox, as for Buddhists and Hindus, pain medication that severely dulls a patient's sensibilities may hinder her
from preparing spiritually for death-a disvalue that, if not absolutely to be avoided, at least ought to be weighed.4
Recent Orthodox, Conservative, and Reformed Jewish
statements stress that both hastening the death and unnecessarily prolonging the life of the dying are wrong. Because most
Jews do not believe in resurrection or an afterlife, they do not
generally hold that PAS/euthanasiajeopardizes a dying person's
future; but there is strong agreement on the more important
point that it is wrong to trespass on the divine prerogative to determine the moment of her death. Palliative care that eases suffering without speeding death is encouraged or even
commanded.5
Muslims cite several Quranic texts against murder, point out
that all suffering has a divine purpose (for instance, encouraging remorse for sin), and exhort doctors to recognize the distinction between the process of living and the process of dying.6
Most Protestant communions recommend palliative care and
termination of extraordinary treatment, are less anxious than
' On Eastern Orthodoxy, see LARUE, supra note 2, at 45-57; Coleson, supra note 2,
at 48; Hamel & DuBose, supra note 2, at 71-74. On Roman Catholicism, see Pope
John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae 1 57, 64-67 (Mar. 25, 1995). On Catholicism, see also
LARUE, supra note 2, at 35-43; THE CHURCHES SPEAK, supra note 2, at 1-53 (citing numerous documents); Coleson, supra note 2, at 45-48. One Conservative treatment of
PAS may be found in BARRY D. C trRON & EARL SCHWARTZ, WHEN LIFE IS IN THE
BALANCE: LIFE AND DEATH DECISIONS IN LIGHT OF THEJEWISH TRADITION (1986).
5 For a general discussion of rabbinic responsa on euthanasia, see LARuE, supra
note 2, at 19-25. On Reform responsa, see Hamel & DuBose, supra note 2, at 46-49.
See also responsa by Reform rabbi Solomon Freehof, in THE CHURCHES SPEAK, supra
note 2, at 193-97, and the discussion by Orthodox rabbi ImmanuelJakobovitz, in id. at
190-93. One Conservative treatment of the issue can be found in BARRYD. CYTRON &

EARL SCHWARTZ, WHEN LIFE Is IN THE BALANCE: LIFE AND DEATH DECISIONS IN LIGHT OF

But see David M. Shohet, Mercy Death in Jewish Law, 8
More ambiguous is the National Council of Jewish Women's recognition of the right to "die
with dignity," inTHE CHURCHES SPEAK, supranote 2, at 190.
6 See LARUE, supra note 2, at 140-41; Hamel & DuBose, supra note 2, at 51-52.
Hamel and DuBose cite the following verses in the Qur'an against killing. 5:3 (killing); 4:29 (suicide). Verse 6:102 (God as Creator of all) is interpreted to mean that
human suffering has a purpose.
THEJEWISH

TRADrnON (1986).

CONSERVATvE JUDAISM 1, 1-15 (1952) (dissenting from this consensus).
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some others about painkillers causing loss of consciousness, but
stop short of euthanasia.
The exceptions are the Unitarian Universalist Association
(UUA) and the more liberal portions of the United Church of
Christ (UCC). Cultural pluralism and a concern to preserve patient autonomy do play a part in their arguments for supporting
those who choose PAS or euthanasia freely, but looming large
for both is the image of a medical institution obsessed with the
prolongation of bodily life and uninterested in matters of the
spirit. Significantly, Unitarian Universalists have no doctrinal
commitment to either reincarnation or resurrection; in the
opinion of8 many, PAS/euthanasia thus has no repercussions for
future life.

II. SIGNIFICANCE FOR POLICY
This quick trip through religious opinions generates mixed
results for the law. On one hand, it yields a near-consensus that
PAS/euthanasia is morally wrong. And this judgment is longstanding, for euthanasia and assisted suicide-unlike in vitro
fertilization, organ transplant, and other recent medical advances-have been a possibility since the dawn of humanity.
The traditions are genuinely unanimous in their conviction that
there is such a thing as an appropriate time to die; that death is
not the ultimate evil; that suffering ought to be eased; that
meaning and hope exist in and transcend suffering; that a cry
for death is often a cry for better dying-more support, comfort, and counsel; and that all care at the end of life should bear
in mind the patient's spiritual well-being.
But the usefulness of this information to judges and legislators-at least on the narrow question of whether
PAS/euthanasia should be legalized-is limited. First, if they
are interested in religious understandings of death's meaning
and in religious arguments for or against assisted suicide it

Protestant refusal to approve euthanasia is rooted in the biblical prohibition of
murder, see Exodus 20:13, and the idea that human beings must not usurp God's prerogative. See also LARUE, supra note 2, at 58-98, 101-17, 120-22 (discussing the Protestant view on PAS, divided by denomination); Hamel & DuBose, supranote 2, at 52-67
(same); Coleson, supranote 2, at 48-54 (same).
8 See LARUE, supra note 2, at 99-100, 118-19; Hamel & DuBose, supra note 2, 68-71;
see also THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF UNITARIAN UNIVERSAuSTS,

(1988).

1988 PROCEEDINGS 74

1998]

RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES

1151

ought to be because they are interested in what people in general think-not as "religionists" but as contributors to a social
consensus without which law is unenforceable. Second, the
near-consensus that does exist is deceptive. Even within those
religious bodies in which concord or autocratic authority is
strong enough to generate a position, there are conscientious
people who dissent.9 And that a conviction is longstanding does
not make it true. Perhaps change is around the corner; other
communities, when they overcome institutional inertia, may follow the more permissive elements of the UUA and UCC.
Finally-and now I write as a layperson with respect to the
law-religious consensus is very shaky ground on which to prohibit assisted suicide because it invites counter-arguments that
assisted suicide is a matter of religious freedom. It is not. Appropriately or inappropriately, the courts rule on whether religious activities seem socially objectionable or acceptable in
themselves, apart from their religious significance. They have
forbidden established religious practices-like peyote use'° or
polygamy"-that contradict dominant social mores-while
permitting others-like the ritual use of alcohol by minorsthat do not. Likewise, at bottom the PAS/euthanasia decision
has nothing to do with religious freedom and everything to do
with whether, in our current context, PAS/euthanasia erodes or
sustains the values and rights to which we are already socially
and constitutionally committed. Hence my final section: the
contribution of feminist ethics, theological and philosophical.
III. FEMINIST CONTRIBUTIONS
Feminist insistence upon factoring context into all discussions of freedoms and rights provides strong additional sup9
Another good example of this phenomenon is opinion on the death penalty: official American religious opinion largely opposes it, but the majority of American citizens support it. See J. GORDON MELTON, THE CHURCHES SPEAK ON: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1989). Iam not aware that any bodies that opposed capital punishment
when this book was published have reversed themselves. But see Robert M. Bohm,
American Death Penalty Opinion 1936-1986: A CriticalExamination of the Gallup Polls, in
THE DEATH PENALTy IN AMERICA: CuRRENT RESEARCH (1991), cited in HELEN PREjEAN,
DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEwTNESS ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PENALT' IN THm UNrrD
STATES 116, 258 n.18 (1993).
'0 See Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990).
" See e.g., Potter v. Murray, 750 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985) (upholding constitutionality of a Utah statute barring plural marriage).
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port-in a form more readily useful to the law than simple religious disapproval or approbation-for Professor Kamisar's opposition to legalizing PAS/euthanasia. For rather than adding
further denominational voices to the debate they ask us to reexamine cultural assumptions-many of which are subtly formed
by religion-that might lie behind apparently areligious legal
judgments.
First, Cathleen Kaveny, Notre Dame theologian and professor of law, reminds us in good feminist fashion of the importance of context to both moral and legal rights. "Rights
language creates and legitimates social practices," and it does so
within an existing culture that is hardly neutral. 12 For example,
the "right" to surrogate motherhood is not a simple matter of
women's freedom to dispose of their bodies as they like. In our
culture it involves the morally questionable pressure for biologically related children; the exploitation of poor women; the
shaming of "barren" ones; and the trafficking of children. We
need to formulate the moral and legal rights of the dying in the
context of equally questionable pressures to reduce costs and
preserve dignity-topics to which I return below.
Second, philosopher Susan Sherwin reminds us that, overall, doctors do not seem to treat female patients with the same
care and respect as male patients. 4 Women's medical complaints have generally been taken less seriously than men's; doctors have been less likely to use existing diagnostic technology
for women and more likely to overmedicate and misdiagnose
them; and the degree of injustice deepens as the patient's skin
color darkens. Thus we have to wonder whether women who
request suicide wish it partly because their doctors have disrespected and abandoned them. Will doctors, if subconsciously,
12

M. Cathleen Kaveny, Assisted Suicide, Euthanasia, and the Law, 58 THEOLOGICAL

STUD. 124, 130-31 (1997). On the same issue with respect to reproductive technologies in general, see SUSAN SHERWIN, No LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH
CARE 117-36 (1992).

"Kaveny, supra note 12, at 130-31; see also SHERWIN, supranote 12.
"SHERWIN, supra note 12, at 223-25.

"Id. Sherwin relies on numerous studies and arguments in drawing her conclusions. See, e.g., GINA CORBA, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: How AMERICAN MEDICINE
MISTREATS WOMEN (rev. ed. 1985); BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER
OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE EXPERTS' ADVICE TO WOMEN (1978); RichardJ. McMurray, Gender Disparities in Clinical Decision-making (Report to the A.M.A. Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs) (1990); see also ALEXANDRA DuNDAS TODD, INTIMATE
ADVERSARIES: CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN DOCTORS AND WOMEN PATIENTS 77 (1989).
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comply with these requests without exploring alternatives, simply because they find women irritating patients? The same
questions must be raised about men of color.
Along these lines, it seems to me that we can learn something from the cost-cutting tactics of managed care and public
responses to them. Health maintenance organizations have, for
example, cut hospital stays for many procedures across the
board-in some cases, from several days to several hours-but
two policies have caught wide attention: discharge of women
within twenty-four hours of giving birth, even when their births
were difficult or their newborns are ill; and radical reductions in
women's hospital stays after mastectomy. Luckily in both cases
legislators have stepped in, but they have obvious reasons for
doing so: these patients will probably be long-lived and loyal
constituents. The dying are not. Were assisted suicide legal, it
is unlikely that legislators would with equal vigor protect the
rights of the dying to the palliative care that would reduce their
desire for euthanasia.
Third, theological ethicist Margaret Farley raises questions
about the significance of the body 6 that should cause us to reexamine our assumptions about the meaning of "death with
dignity." For centuries the West has associated masculinity, immortality, and goodness with the rational mind, and femininity,
senescence, and evil with the body. 17 Is there any chance that
our fascination with rationally controlling death has something
to do with a theological or philosophical repugnance at our
bodies' gaining the upper hand? Is our shame at the gradual
decay of our own bodies not perhaps inappropriate? Are normal human pain, incontinence, fear, and dependence inherently undignified? Or is it only that we treat people who suffer
from them in undignified ways?

Finally, as theologian Mary McClintock Fulkerson and philosopher Martha Craven Nussbaum have argued, each in her
own way, what it is that each of us would need in order to cross
16 Margaret

A. Farley, Feminist Theology and Bioethics, in WOMEN'S CONSCIOusNESs,

WOMEN'S CONSCIENCE: A READER IN FEMIST ETIcs 285, 291-93 (Barbara Hilkert Andolsen et al. eds., 1985).
17 This is a claim of considerable standing within contemporary
western feminism,
particularly Christian feminism. For one articulation, see ROSEMARY RADFORD
RUETHER, GAiA AND GOD: AN ECOFEMrINsT THEOLOGY OF EARTH HEALUNG cbs. 5-7
(1992).
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the threshold of dignity and flourishing depends upon what we
already have, and that in turn depends upon our position within
society.1 8 The wealthy or well-insured terminally ill elderly may
need to be freed from ill-advised overuse of life support technology and to be made more comfortable in death. These are
changes we can in theory accommodate within existing practices
and institutions. But the larger problem is that the poor-and
increasingly, the middle class-do not even become victims of
medical vitalism, because they have limited or inconsistent access to basic care to begin with. Debates like this one, if they are
in effect arguments of the privileged over our right to control
our own deaths, divert too much moral energy from the task of
figuring out how to care justly for the majority of the dying-not
to mention the living. In their professional roles, lawyers and
judges may be able to do little to solve that problem. But as
people who possess authority and social power, they can do
much.

's MARY MCLINTOCK FULERSON, CHANGING THE SuBJEaCr: WOMEN'S DiscouRsES AND
FEMINIST THEOLOGY 355-95 (1994); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioningand SocialJustice: In Defense of AristotelianEssentialism, 20 POE. THEORY 202, 231-33 (1992).
Fulkerson addresses the effects of social and religious position on spiritual needs and
Nussbaum, the effects of social location on other human needs.

